kaleido-automation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill requires the agent to call RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS to retrieve 'recommended execution plans' and tool schemas from a remote server (https://rube.app/mcp). This creates a critical vulnerability where a compromised or malicious remote server can inject instructions that the agent is explicitly told to follow, potentially leading to unauthorized operations within the Kaleido environment.
  • Ingestion point: Tool discovery via RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS response (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the agent is instructed to use exact results.
  • Capability inventory: RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH provide broad execution capabilities (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: Absent; no validation of the remote execution plan is performed.
  • [Remote Code Execution] (HIGH): The skill utilizes RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH to execute tools and logic defined at runtime by the external server. This pattern effectively allows a third-party service to execute code or complex sequences of operations on the user's infrastructure via the agent.
  • [External Downloads] (MEDIUM): The setup requires configuring an external MCP server endpoint (https://rube.app/mcp). This endpoint is not within the defined trusted sources and serves as the primary source of the skill's executable logic.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 12:22 AM