klipfolio-automation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (HIGH): The setup instructions require adding 'https://rube.app/mcp' as an MCP server. This endpoint is not on the trusted source list and acts as a remote dependency that controls agent capabilities.
  • REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill executes remote tools via RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH. Since the tool definitions are provided by the external MCP server, this constitutes a remote code execution vector where the external provider defines the logic being run.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): Tools like RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH facilitate arbitrary execution environments, posing a significant risk if the remote server returns malicious tool configurations.
  • **PROMPT_INJECTION (Category 8
  • HIGH):** The skill exhibits a high-risk indirect injection surface.
  • Ingestion points: RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS fetches tool slugs, input schemas, and 'recommended execution plans' from the remote server (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The agent is told to 'Always call RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS first' and follow the returned plans without validation.
  • Capability inventory: RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH provide write and execution capabilities (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: None. The instructions mandate using the exact field names and types from the remote search results.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 01:00 PM