l2s-automation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill's primary workflow relies on RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS to fetch execution schemas.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via tool discovery results from https://rube.app/mcp.
  • Boundary markers: None. The instructions explicitly tell the agent to follow the schemas provided by the external tool.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can execute arbitrary tools via RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH.
  • Sanitization: None. The agent is instructed to use 'exact field names and types' from the untrusted external response.
  • [Remote Code Execution] (HIGH): The skill requires the user to add an untrusted external endpoint (https://rube.app/mcp) as an MCP server. This server defines the logic for 'tools' which the agent then executes, effectively allowing the remote server to control agent actions.
  • [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill facilitates the execution of blockchain operations (L2 tasks) which are high-impact side effects. When combined with the unverified tool discovery process, this poses a risk of financial loss or state manipulation.
  • [External Downloads] (LOW): References external documentation and endpoints (composio.dev, rube.app) which are not on the trusted source list, though they are necessary for the skill's stated function.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 12:57 PM