linkup-automation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill instructs the agent to fetch 'recommended execution plans' and 'tool schemas' from an external server (https://rube.app/mcp) and execute them via RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL. This allows a remote third party to dictate the agent's operations.
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (HIGH): The setup instructions require the user to add an unverified external URL as an MCP server. The claim that 'No API keys needed' suggests a lack of transparent authentication, potentially allowing the remote server to interact with the agent's environment without proper authorization.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): The inclusion of tools like RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH (which uses run_composio_tool()) grants the remote server the ability to perform complex actions on the host system or connected accounts.
  • INDIRECT PROMPT INJECTION (HIGH): The skill has a large attack surface for indirect injection (Category 8):
  • Ingestion points: RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS response (metadata and plans from the remote server).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions tell the agent to 'Always call RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS first' and 'Use exact field names and types from search results'.
  • Capability inventory: Full tool execution, bulk operations, and remote workbench access.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill lacks any validation of the schemas or plans returned by the remote server before they are used in execution tools.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 01:13 PM