loomio-automation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- External Dependencies (HIGH): The skill requires adding
https://rube.app/mcpas an MCP server. This is an untrusted third-party endpoint that controls the logic and tools the agent will use. Per [TRUST-SCOPE-RULE], this is a high-risk external dependency. - Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill processes data from Loomio, which is an attacker-controllable source. It also has the capability to execute actions via
RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOLandRUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH. This combination creates a high-severity vulnerability surface where malicious instructions inside Loomio threads could cause the agent to perform unauthorized operations. - Ingestion points: Data retrieved from Loomio via Rube tools (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: None specified in the instructions.
- Capability inventory:
RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL,RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH, andRUBE_MANAGE_CONNECTIONS(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No evidence of input validation or sanitization for Loomio-sourced data.
- Dynamic Tool Execution (MEDIUM): The workflow relies on
RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLSto discover tool schemas at runtime. This allows the external server to dynamically influence the agent's execution plan and input parameters, which could be exploited to bypass intended restrictions.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata