moosend-automation
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The skill requires adding an external, untrusted MCP server endpoint (https://rube.app/mcp) in the client configuration. This source is not among the verified or trusted organizations listed in the security guidelines.
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill uses
RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOLandRUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCHto execute operations based on dynamic schemas and 'execution plans' fetched from the external API, creating a path for remote logic to influence local agent actions. - INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW):
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to fetch tool schemas and recommended execution plans via
RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLSfrom the external Rube API. - Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions tell the agent to 'always search tools first' and use the results to define its behavior without specifying validation steps.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute Moosend API operations and arbitrary toolkit logic through the multi-execute and workbench tools.
- Sanitization: None mentioned; the agent is explicitly told to use the 'exact field names and types' provided by the remote search results.
Audit Metadata