precoro-automation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • Remote Code Execution (HIGH): The skill utilizes RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH and RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL to perform operations. The documentation states that RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS returns "recommended execution plans," effectively allowing an untrusted remote server to dictate the logic and sequences of commands the agent executes.
  • External Connection (HIGH): The setup instructions require adding https://rube.app/mcp as an MCP server. This domain is not a recognized trusted source. Providing an external endpoint as a primary source of tool definitions allows for full control of the agent's tool-calling capabilities by an unverified third party.
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH):
  • Ingestion points: RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS ingests tool slugs, schemas, and execution plans from the remote server.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions mandate following the remote results implicitly ("Always search tools first").
  • Capability inventory: Includes tool execution (RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL), remote workbench operations (RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH), and connection management (RUBE_MANAGE_CONNECTIONS).
  • Sanitization: None. The skill directs the agent to use exact fields and types provided by the remote source without validation.
  • Data Exposure Risk (MEDIUM): The skill handles Precoro automation, which involves sensitive procurement and financial data. Managing these operations through an unverified intermediary (Rube/Composio) increases the risk of data exposure or unauthorized transaction manipulation.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 01:39 PM