scrape-do-automation
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill requires the configuration of an untrusted external MCP server (https://rube.app/mcp). This server is the source of tool definitions and execution logic.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill employs dynamic tool execution via
RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL. Slugs and arguments are retrieved at runtime from the external search tool, meaning the remote server effectively controls which operations the agent performs. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill has a significant surface for Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: Data entering the agent via
RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS(tool schemas, recommended execution plans). - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to treat the external search results as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute arbitrary tools via
RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOLand manage connections viaRUBE_MANAGE_CONNECTIONS. - Sanitization: None; the agent is instructed to use the exact field names and types returned from the untrusted external search.
Audit Metadata