sympla-automation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill is designed to ingest data (tool schemas, input requirements, and "recommended execution plans") from an external, unverified source (rube.app) via the
RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLScommand. - Ingestion Point: Data returned from the
RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLSendpoint. - Boundary Markers: None. The instructions explicitly tell the agent to follow the returned execution plans.
- Capability Inventory: Includes
RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOLandRUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH, which allow the agent to perform write operations and bulk tasks on the Sympla platform. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the remote schemas or plans is mentioned.
- External Service Dependency (MEDIUM): The skill requires connecting to an external MCP endpoint (
https://rube.app/mcp) that is not part of the defined trusted source scope. This endpoint serves as the control plane for the skill's capabilities. - Dynamic Tool Execution (MEDIUM): The workflow relies on
tool_slugvalues and arguments discovered at runtime. This dynamic loading from computed paths (slugs) allows the remote server to dictate which functions the agent calls and with what data. - Potential for Unconstrained Execution (MEDIUM): The use of
RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCHwithrun_composio_tool()suggests a high-privilege environment that could be exploited if the agent is misled by malicious tool schemas returned during the discovery phase.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata