trello-automation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Tools such as
TRELLO_GET_SEARCH,TRELLO_GET_BOARDS_LISTS_BY_ID_BOARD, andTRELLO_GET_BOARDS_CARDS_BY_ID_BOARDingest data from external Trello cards and boards which are attacker-controlled sources. - Boundary markers: The skill documentation provides no instructions for the agent to use delimiters or ignore instructions found within the Trello data.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to perform write operations including
TRELLO_ADD_CARDS,TRELLO_UPDATE_CARDS_BY_ID_CARD(moving cards), andTRELLO_ADD_CARDS_ACTIONS_COMMENTS_BY_ID_CARD(posting comments). - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the input from Trello before it is used in subsequent operations or agent reasoning.
- [External Downloads] (LOW): The skill instructs users to connect to an external MCP server hosted at
rube.app/mcp. This domain is not within the defined [TRUST-SCOPE-RULE] whitelist, requiring users to trust the security of the third-party endpoint provider.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata