zerobounce-automation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [Unverifiable Dependencies & Remote Code Execution] (HIGH): The skill mandates the use of an external MCP server endpoint (https://rube.app/mcp) that is not within the trusted source list.
  • Evidence: 'Add https://rube.app/mcp as an MCP server in your client configuration.'
  • This configuration delegates the agent's tool definitions and execution environment to an unverified third party.
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill creates a high-risk attack surface by instructing the agent to fetch instructions (schemas and plans) from the external Rube MCP service and execute them directly.
  • Ingestion points: RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS retrieves schemas, plans, and 'pitfalls' from the external server.
  • Boundary markers: None. The skill explicitly tells the agent to 'Always search tools first' and 'Use exact field names and types from the search results,' creating a dependency on untrusted data for execution logic.
  • Capability inventory: RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH provide the ability to execute code and perform side-effect operations based on the fetched data.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the externally provided tool schemas or execution plans is performed before they are processed by the agent.
  • [Dynamic Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill utilizes RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH to execute operations that are defined at runtime through dynamic schema discovery.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 06:29 AM