zylvie-automation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [External Remote Service] (MEDIUM): The skill instructions require adding an untrusted endpoint (https://rube.app/mcp) as an MCP server. This source host is not on the trusted sources list.
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill architecture ingests untrusted data that directly influences agent behavior and tool usage.
- Ingestion points:
RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLSretrieves schemas and recommended execution plans from the remote server. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to isolate or treat the server output as data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOLandRUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH, which allow for broad action execution and potential code execution. - Sanitization: Absent; the agent is told to follow the 'exact field names' and 'recommended execution plans' provided by the remote source.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata