connect
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): This skill creates a significant attack surface by connecting the agent to external, attacker-controlled data sources such as emails and chat messages. An attacker could send a message containing hidden instructions that the agent then executes using the skill's write capabilities. Ingestion points: Data retrieved via 1,000+ integrations managed by the Composio router. Boundary markers: None defined in the skill documentation or example code. Capability inventory: Full write and delete access across Gmail, Slack, GitHub, and various databases. Sanitization: None present.
- [Data Exposure & Exfiltration] (HIGH): The core functionality of the skill is to move data between services, which serves as a pre-built exfiltration pathway if the agent is compromised via prompt injection. The agent has direct access to move information from sensitive environments (S3, PostgreSQL) to external social or chat platforms.
- [External Downloads] (MEDIUM): The skill relies on third-party libraries (composio, @composio/core) from sources not included in the trusted whitelist, requiring the user to trust the package maintainers' security practices.
- [Dynamic Execution] (MEDIUM): Uses the Model Context Protocol (MCP) with dynamic URLs (session.mcp.url) to route actions, allowing for runtime tool execution that is not fully auditable from the static skill definition.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata