skill-installer
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (CRITICAL): The skill is designed to fetch, download, and install external 'skills' (which contain executable logic and instructions) from any GitHub repository into the agent's home directory ($CODEX_HOME/skills). This allows for arbitrary code execution if a user is directed to install a malicious repository.
- CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE (HIGH): The
scripts/github_utils.pyfile automatically attaches theGITHUB_TOKENorGH_TOKENenvironment variables to requests. Because the repository and path are user-controllable via CLI arguments inlist-curated-skills.py, an attacker could potentially trick the tool into sending the token to a malicious API endpoint (SSRF/Credential theft). - COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): The documentation in
SKILL.mdindicates that the installer scripts usegit sparse checkoutand direct downloads, and explicitly instructs the agent to 'request escalation' (sudo/admin access) when running in a sandbox environment. - EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (HIGH): The skill performs unverified downloads from remote sources. While it defaults to
openai/skills(a trusted organization), it provides explicit functionality to download from any arbitrary--repoor--urlprovided by a user or an attacker. - INDIRECT PROMPT INJECTION (HIGH): The skill processes directory names and metadata from remote GitHub repositories without sanitization. An attacker controlling a repository could use malicious directory names or skill metadata to influence the agent's behavior during the 'list' or 'install' phases.
- PERSISTENCE MECHANISM (HIGH): By installing files into the
$CODEX_HOME/skillsdirectory, the skill creates a permanent presence in the agent's environment that persists across sessions and is automatically loaded on restart.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata