ai-dev-tools-sync
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- PROMPT_INJECTION (HIGH): The skill is highly vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) as it processes external, untrusted content and uses it to modify core agent behavior files.\n
- Ingestion points: Web search results for queries like "GitHub Copilot features setup 2026" and local reference files (SKILL.md, Step 2).\n
- Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to ignore or delimit embedded commands within the search results.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant file-write capabilities, modifying
CLAUDE.md,.github/copilot-instructions.md, and creating new executable/instructional files in.claude/and.github/directories (SKILL.md, Step 4).\n - Sanitization: Absent; external content is used directly to define the behavior and capabilities of the agent without validation or filtering.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata