mcp-management

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (LOW): The core functionality of the skill (found in scripts/mcp-client.ts) involves spawning subprocesses via StdioClientTransport. This is the intended primary purpose of the skill to run MCP servers. The commands and arguments are sourced from a local configuration file (.claude/.mcp.json).
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (LOW): The skill documentation (README.md, references/gemini-cli-integration.md) recommends installing the gemini-cli (a tool from the trusted google-gemini organization) and various MCP servers using npm and npx. While these involve external downloads, they are standard components of the MCP ecosystem.
  • PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it fetches and processes data from external MCP servers without applying strict boundary markers or sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested through getAllTools, getAllPrompts, and getAllResources methods in scripts/mcp-client.ts which communicate with external servers.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or security instructions are used when presenting the output of MCP servers to the agent.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute arbitrary commands (configured as MCP servers) and perform file-write operations (assets/tools.json).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from external MCP servers.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:49 PM