agent-browser

HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

• Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 0.90). The prompt contains explicit examples that embed plaintext credentials verbatim in CLI commands (e.g., agent-browser fill @e2 "password123" and chained commands with literal passwords), which would require the LLM to output secret values directly even though safer alternatives are also mentioned.

CRITICAL E005: Suspicious download URL detected in skill instructions.

• Suspicious download URL detected (high risk: 0.70). At least one URL (https://malicious.com) is explicitly malicious and several others are ambiguous/internal or staging domains (plus localhost) that could host untrusted executables — there are no clearly authoritative vendor/package-manager download endpoints, so this combined list presents a moderate-to-high risk of malware distribution.

MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

• Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill explicitly navigates and ingests arbitrary public web content (e.g., SKILL.md commands like "agent-browser open ", "agent-browser snapshot -i", "agent-browser get text body" and templates such as templates/capture-workflow.sh and templates/form-automation.sh) and by default imposes no restrictions, so untrusted third-party pages can be read and directly influence agent actions.