playwright-interactive

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: In SKILL.md, the instructions explicitly direct the user to bypass the agent's security sandbox by starting the process with the --sandbox danger-full-access flag. This removes execution constraints and provides the agent with full access to the local host environment.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In SKILL.md, the skill utilizes shell commands to initialize the workspace, install dependencies via npm, and run persistent development servers for debugging purposes.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: In SKILL.md, the setup process downloads and installs the playwright and electron packages from their official registries and fetches the Chromium browser binary.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: In SKILL.md, the skill captures screenshots of local web and desktop application interfaces and emits them to the model using codex.emitImage. This facilitates the transmission of potentially sensitive visual data from the local environment to an external service.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: In SKILL.md, the skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it interacts with and processes untrusted content from external websites and local applications.
  • Ingestion points: Web content loaded via page.goto() and application context/state accessed via appWindow.evaluate().
  • Boundary markers: None are present in the REPL instructions to distinguish between developer commands and data-originated instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Full shell execution via js_repl and persistent TTY sessions, combined with the explicitly requested removal of sandbox restrictions.
  • Sanitization: None; the agent processes and interprets the DOM and application context directly for QA evaluation.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 23, 2026, 08:01 PM