rag-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides an implementation that is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data is ingested into the system via the
addDocumentmethod (which stores document content) and thequerymethod (which accepts user questions) insrc/services/rag.service.ts. - Boundary markers: The implementation in
src/utils/ollama.tslacks sufficient boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions; it uses simple string templates likeContext: ${context}\n\nQuestion: ${prompt}to combine retrieved data with user queries. - Capability inventory: The code provides capabilities to read from and write to a PostgreSQL database and generate text via a connected Ollama LLM service.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the retrieved context strings before they are interpolated into the final prompt sent to the LLM.
Audit Metadata