find-skills

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads binary archives and metadata from lightmake.site and Tencent Cloud Object Storage (myqcloud.com).
  • Evidence: SKILLHUB_INSTALL_KIT_URL, SKILLHUB_SEARCH_URL, and SKILLHUB_PRIMARY_DOWNLOAD_URL_TEMPLATE in scripts/skillhub_tool.py.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The bootstrap and install commands download zip/tar archives from the internet and extract them into the workspace or user home directory, effectively installing external executable scripts.
  • Evidence: install_skill_archive and command_bootstrap functions using safe_extract_zip and safe_extract_tar in scripts/skillhub_tool.py.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script executes shell commands via the subprocess module to configure the local 'openclaw' environment, detect software versions, and manage a local gateway process.
  • Evidence: Calls to subprocess.run and subprocess.Popen in configure_plugin, disable_plugin_if_present, and restart_gateway_if_needed.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests untrusted metadata (skill names and summaries) from a remote API which are then presented to the agent.
  • Ingestion points: fetch_search_results in scripts/skillhub_tool.py.
  • Boundary markers: Absent in the prompt construction.
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution, file system modifications, and network requests are available via the skill's own tooling.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization is performed on the descriptive strings retrieved from the API before they are output to the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 7, 2026, 03:39 AM