gh-address-comments
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill fetches content from GitHub PR comments and reviews, which are attacker-controllable sources.\n
- Ingestion points:
scripts/fetch_comments.py(lines 51, 65, 85) extracts thebodyfield of comments and review threads via the GraphQL API.\n - Boundary markers: Absent. No delimiters or specific instructions are provided to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the fetched text.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill is instructed to 'Apply fixes' based on the comments, which grants the agent the ability to modify the filesystem and execute build/test commands.\n
- Sanitization: Absent. The external data is used directly for reasoning and task execution.\n- Privilege Escalation (HIGH):
SKILL.mdexplicitly requestssandbox_permissions=require_escalatedand 'elevated network access' to runghCLI commands, bypassing standard security restrictions.\n- Command Execution (MEDIUM):scripts/fetch_comments.pyusessubprocess.runto execute commands on the host system. While the commands themselves are largely static, the high-privilege context and exposure to untrusted input create a significant attack surface.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata