port-daddy-cli
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill allows the execution of arbitrary shell commands through the
.portdaddyrcconfiguration'scmdfield and thewith-locktool (e.g.,pd with-lock deployment -- npm run deploy). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection by design, as it ingests and processes data from other potentially untrusted or compromised agents via the messaging and notes systems.
- Ingestion points:
add_note,publish_message,get_messages, andcheck_salvage(as described inSKILL.mdandapi-reference.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill lacks delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands within shared messages or notes.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via
cmdandwith-lock, file system scanning viascan_project, and network operations viatunnelsandwebhooks. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of data retrieved from the inter-agent messaging or note-taking systems.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
webhooksandtunnelsfeatures allow the agent to transmit internal data to external URLs or expose local services to the public internet. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and depends on the
port-daddyNPM package and an external local daemon process.
Audit Metadata