skills/cygnusfear/agent-skills/blitz/Gen Agent Trust Hub

blitz

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 25, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8c) because it extracts requirements from external GitHub issues to instruct sub-agents.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via the gh issue view command used in Phase 3 of SKILL.md to extract issue requirements.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt template uses markdown formatting, but lacks explicit instructions to the sub-agent to ignore potential malicious directives embedded within the issue body.
  • Capability inventory: The delegated agents are authorized to perform file system modifications, execute tests (npm, cargo, node), and interact with the repository using the gh CLI.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of escaping, filtering, or validation of the content retrieved from GitHub issues before it is interpolated into the agent prompts.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of local command execution to manage the git lifecycle and GitHub integration.
  • Evidence: Use of git worktree, git rebase, and git push --force-with-lease for workspace management.
  • Evidence: Orchestration of the GitHub CLI (gh) for PR creation, merging, and issue management.
  • Context: These operations are consistent with the skill's primary purpose as a development orchestration tool.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Feb 25, 2026, 11:31 AM