create-pr

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 27, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes instructions to the AI to suppress its identity or tool attribution, specifically forbidding the inclusion of footers like "Generated with Claude Code" in PR descriptions.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from external sources.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads data from git log, git diff, gh issue list, and gh issue view to generate PR content.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to help the agent distinguish between data and potential instructions embedded in commit messages or issue descriptions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute subprocesses via git and gh, including creating new Pull Requests with the processed content.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is present to filter malicious instructions from the ingested git or GitHub data before interpolation into the PR body.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell command substitution ($(...)) and heredocs to dynamically build the gh pr create command using output from other local git and GitHub CLI operations.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Feb 27, 2026, 08:48 AM