multi-tenancy

[Skill Scanner] Credential file access detected All findings: [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] This skill is a legitimate multi-tenancy implementation and documentation. I found no signs of obfuscation, credential harvesting, backdoors, remote exfiltration, or other malware. The main security concerns are operational/misconfiguration risks: trusting client-supplied tenant identifiers without strict authentication/validation, potential DB query mutation edge-cases in the Prisma extension, lack of tenant-id validation, and cache synchronization issues. Recommend: validate and canonicalize tenant identifiers, ensure tenant resolution is tied to authentication for sensitive routes, add defensive checks around args merging, add TTL/eviction for config cache or use distributed cache for multi-process deployments, and document RLS/session-variable setup for pooled DB connections. LLM verification: No evidence of malicious code or supply-chain exfiltration in the provided fragments. The skill implements reasonable multi-tenancy primitives (AsyncLocalStorage context, tenant-resolving middleware, and Prisma query extensions) that fit the stated purpose. However, there are security concerns: trusting headers/subdomains without strict auth, potential merging/override issues in Prisma argument handling, and missing validation/typing around request and DB objects. These are design/implementation