planning-with-files

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The primary workflow encourages the agent to ingest untrusted data from external sources and store it in persistent files that are later used as 'working memory' to guide decisions.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted research findings are written to notes.md and task_plan.md (documented in SKILL.md and examples.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The templates use standard markdown headers but provide no delimiters or instructions to ignore potentially embedded commands within the ingested data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes extensive file read/write/edit capabilities and explicitly demonstrates bash command execution for file management in examples.md.
  • Sanitization: There is no mechanism described for sanitizing or filtering external content before it is processed or re-read into the prompt context.
  • [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill examples frequently use bash code blocks to perform file operations. While functional, this establishes a pattern where the agent is encouraged to use a shell environment, which increases the potential impact of a successful prompt injection attack.
  • [Metadata Poisoning] (LOW): The reference.md file contains hallucinated or misleading claims regarding a $2 billion acquisition in 'December 2025'. While not directly executable, this deceptive metadata may attempt to falsely establish authority or reliability to influence agent behavior.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 01:16 PM