Knowledge Graph Builder
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill instructions define workflows for extracting information from external 'documents' and 'verified sources' (README.md). When combined with the manifest-declared capabilities to
modifies_filesandcreates_artifacts, this creates a high-severity surface for indirect prompt injection. An attacker could embed malicious instructions in a processed document to exploit the agent's file system access.\n - Ingestion points: Processes external 'documents' and 'verified sources' for entity/relationship extraction (README.md Phase 3).\n
- Boundary markers: None specified in the instructions to help the agent distinguish between data and instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The manifest specifies
modifies_filesandcreates_artifactsas side effects.\n - Sanitization: No input validation or sanitization mechanisms are mentioned in the provided guidance.\n- Metadata Poisoning (MEDIUM): The
manifest.yamllabels therisk_levelas 'low'. This is a misleading metadata claim as the combination of file-system write capabilities and untrusted data ingestion represents a higher risk profile than stated.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata