Manifest Generator

Functionally, the manifest generator performs as described: it reads descriptions/optional implementation snippets, prompts an LLM to produce a manifest, validates the YAML, and writes it back. The primary security concern is unintended data exfiltration to an external LLM: descriptions, registry entries, and code snippets are inlined verbatim into prompts without redaction, allow/deny controls, or enterprise protections. The bootstrap script's bulk processing increases the blast radius. There is no evidence of active malicious code (backdoors or obfuscated payloads) in the provided fragment, but the design enables leakage of secrets and proprietary data if present. Recommend immediate mitigations before use in sensitive environments: (1) add file allowlists/denylists and redact or strip secrets before sending, (2) prefer private/enterprise model endpoints with contract/retention guarantees, (3) limit bootstrap bulk operations and add dry-run/sampling modes, (4) log and sign generated manifests with provenance metadata, and (5) secure API key handling (scoped/ephemeral tokens and rotation).