skill-creator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]:
scripts/execute_chain.js: Uses theFunctionconstructor to evaluate JavaScript expressions dynamically assembled from templates within theevaluateConditionmethod. This allows for arbitrary code execution if the source chain definition is untrusted or compromised.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]:
assets/scheduler-cron.sh: Programmatically modifies the user's system crontab usingcrontab -landcrontab -to install or uninstall scheduled tasks. This creates system-level persistence that persists beyond the skill's execution session.scripts/assign_codex.js: Implements an execution path that explicitly uses the--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxflag when invoking the external Codex CLI. This intentionally removes security boundaries and approval requirements intended to protect the host system.scripts/assign_codex.js: Constructs shell commands by interpolating Base64-encoded prompts into a command string executed viaexecSync, which can be a vector for shell injection if inputs are not strictly validated.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- The skill has a significant attack surface for Indirect Prompt Injection. It ingests untrusted user requests (via
detect_mode.jsandanalyze_request.md) and uses them to generate executable code, agent task specifications, and documentation. - Ingestion points:
detect_mode.js(--request argument),analyze_request.md(user input text). - Boundary markers: No explicit markers or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are applied to the user-provided data before it is processed by the generation agents.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the
Bash,Write,Edit, andTasktools, allowing it to execute arbitrary shell commands and write files based on generated content. - Sanitization: The skill lacks rigorous sanitization of external content before it is interpolated into templates for code or prompt generation.
Audit Metadata