pptx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pyimplements a process injection mechanism. It writes an embedded C source string to a temporary file, compiles it into a shared object usinggcc, and then injects it into thesoffice(LibreOffice) process via theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable. This is intended to bypass AF_UNIX socket restrictions in restricted environments but represents a high-risk technical pattern. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation in
SKILL.mdandpptxgenjs.mdrequires the installation of various third-party dependencies from public registries, includingpptxgenjs(npm),markitdown(pip), and several UI-related libraries (react,react-icons,sharp). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an Indirect Prompt Injection surface (Category 8). It ingests untrusted data from user-provided
.pptxfiles (ingestion point:SKILL.md) and provides the agent with powerful capabilities like subprocess execution and file system access (capability inventory:soffice.py,add_slide.py). The skill lacks explicit sanitization or boundary markers to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded within processed presentation content. - [SAFE]: The skill correctly mitigates XML-based vulnerabilities by using the
defusedxmllibrary instead of standardxml.etreefor all parsing operations inunpack.py,clean.py, andthumbnail.py. This is an industry-standard protection against XML External Entity (XXE) attacks.
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