agentpulse-setup
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The skill requires the installation of the
agentpulsepackage from the npm registry. This package is not from a trusted organization (e.g., Anthropic, OpenAI) and its security cannot be verified during static analysis. - COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill uses
npx agentpulseto execute a local server andnpm installfor dependency management. Running unverified packages can lead to arbitrary code execution on the local machine. - DATA_EXPOSURE (MEDIUM): The instructions require editing the
claude_desktop_config.jsonfile. This is a sensitive configuration file that manages agent capabilities and server registrations. - PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): This skill sets up an indirect prompt injection surface by bridging application state directly to an AI agent via the Model Context Protocol (MCP). Ingestion points: Application state and interactive component data are exposed via the
useExposehook (e.g., inApp.tsxand interactive components). Boundary markers: No delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings are implemented in the setup pattern. Capability inventory: The bridge allows the agent to read state and potentially modify it viasetValuebindings, which could be exploited if the app state contains malicious instructions from an untrusted user. Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the data being passed through the bridge.
Audit Metadata