Council
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Dynamic Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill is designed to load and apply configurations and resources from a local path (
~/.claude/skills/CORE/USER/SKILLCUSTOMIZATIONS/Council/) to override its default logic. This dynamic loading mechanism allows local files to modify the agent's core behavior, serving as a potential vector for persistent prompt injection. Evidence:SKILL.md. - [Command Execution] (LOW): The skill executes a
curlPOST request tohttp://localhost:8888/notifyfor voice notifications. Whilelocalhostis a whitelisted domain for exfiltration analysis, the use of unauthenticated shell-based network calls remains a minor risk surface. Evidence:SKILL.md. - [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The debate and quick workflows interpolate untrusted data (user-provided topics and agent transcripts) directly into subsequent prompts without sanitization. 1. Ingestion points:
[Topic]and[Full Round 1 transcript]. 2. Boundary markers: Absent; the data is injected into instructions without delimiters. 3. Capability inventory: File reading and shell command execution (curl). 4. Sanitization: No validation or escaping is performed on the ingested content. Evidence:Workflows/Debate.md,Workflows/Quick.md.
Audit Metadata