Parser
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- PROMPT_INJECTION (HIGH): The skill is highly vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8). It is designed specifically to ingest and analyze untrusted data from external URLs, transcripts, and documents.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via URLs processed in
lib/parser.tsand through various content extractors in theWorkflows/directory (YouTube transcripts, PDF text, article HTML). - Boundary markers: Prompts in the
Prompts/directory (e.g.,entity-extraction.md,summarization.md) use triple-quote (""") delimiters to wrap external content. While present, these are insufficient to prevent a determined adversarial injection embedded in the processed content. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands (
yt,pdftotext,pdfinfo,curl), write files to the local file system (Bun.write,fs.writeFile), and perform local network requests. - Sanitization: No significant sanitization or instruction-filtering is performed on the content before it is interpolated into the LLM prompts.
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): Multiple workflows (e.g.,
ExtractYoutube.md,ExtractPdf.md,ExtractBrowserExtension.md) instruct the agent to execute shell commands using external utilities. - Evidence: Use of
yt --transcript,pdftotext,pdfinfo,unzip, andcurlfor downloading and processing files. While the current implementation inlib/parser.tscontains placeholders, the workflows explicitly direct the agent to perform these actions, which could be exploited if an attacker can manipulate filenames or URL structures. - EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The skill automatically downloads remote files for analysis.
- Evidence:
ExtractPdf.mddownloads PDF files viacurl.ExtractBrowserExtension.mdfetches browser extension CRX files from Google's servers. While the sources described are often trusted (e.g., Google, ArXiv), the skill acts as a bridge for remote content to reach the local system's utilities. - DATA_EXFILTRATION (LOW): The skill performs automated network requests to
localhost:8888/notifyfor 'voice notifications'. - Evidence: Every workflow in
SKILL.mdand theWorkflows/directory begins with a mandatorycurlcommand to a local server. While targeting localhost reduces the risk of remote exfiltration, it represents an automated side-channel for internal data flow.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata