skill-manager
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill possesses a high-risk attack surface due to its core management functions.
- Ingestion points: The skill uses
read_fileandgrepto ingest the content ofSKILL.mdfiles from any subdirectory in the environment (e.g.,SKILL.mdfrom other potentially malicious skills). - Boundary markers: There are no markers or delimiters used when processing external skill content to distinguish between instructions and data.
- Capability inventory: The agent is explicitly authorized to read and write (modify) other skill files via the 'Repair' logic, and it can execute shell commands (
grep,npx). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the content extracted from external skills before it is summarized and written back to the filesystem.
- Command Execution (MEDIUM): The skill utilizes shell commands (
grep,npx,bun) to perform its tasks. Thegrepcommand uses wildcard path expansion (${SKILL_DIR}/../*/SKILL.md), which allows it to access data across the entire skill ecosystem, increasing the impact of any potential injection. - External Downloads (LOW): The execution of
npx -y buntriggers a download of thebunruntime from the npm registry if it is not already present in the environment. While npm is a standard source, runtime fetching adds a layer of dependency risk.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata