wt
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The shell function in
references/wt.bashusessource "$main/.wtsetup"to load configuration. Since.wtsetupis a shell script generated from project-level analysis, this executes its contents in the user's shell environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Both
references/wt.bashandreferences/wt.fishuseevalto execute commands stored in theinstallandpost_setupvariables within the.wtsetupfile. These commands are automatically derived from the project's lockfiles and directory structure. - [PERSISTENCE_MECHANISMS]: The skill guides the user to modify shell startup files (e.g.,
~/.bashrc,~/.zshrc) or the fish functions directory to install thewtcommand. This is the primary delivery mechanism for the utility. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The
scripts/analyze-project.shscript is specifically designed to locate sensitive files like.env*,master.key, and.secret*to ensure they are replicated in new worktrees. While the data is handled locally, the skill proactively identifies and manages sensitive file paths. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill generates instructions for the
wtcommand by scanning repository contents (lockfiles, compose files). A malicious repository could theoretically influence the generatedinstallorpost_setupcommands, though the skill mitigates this by instructing the user to review the configuration before use. - Ingestion points:
scripts/analyze-project.shreadsdocker-compose.yml, various lockfiles, and file listings from the project root. - Boundary markers: None used in the generated
.wtsetupfile or during theevalexecution. - Capability inventory: Uses
git worktree,mkdir,cp,ln,sed, and arbitrary command execution viaeval. - Sanitization: The branch name is slugified, but the commands extracted from lockfiles are not sanitized before being placed in
evalstrings.
Audit Metadata