databricks-unity-catalog

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection due to the nature of the data it retrieves.
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested from external files in Volumes (via read_files and download_from_volume) and from system tables like system.access.audit and system.query.history, which contain user-controlled strings (e.g., SQL statements, email addresses, and request parameters).
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters shown to prevent the LLM from following instructions that might be embedded in these data sources.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has high-privilege capabilities including SQL execution (mcp__databricks__execute_sql), file deletion (delete_volume_file), and file uploads (upload_to_volume).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of external content is specified before it is processed by the agent.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes tools designed for bilateral data movement.
  • The upload_to_volume and download_from_volume functions facilitate moving data between the local agent environment and cloud storage, which provides a technical pathway for data exfiltration if the agent's logic is subverted.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation references and demonstrates the use of administrative interfaces.
  • It provides examples for using the Databricks CLI and the databricks-sdk to modify system schemas, grant permissions, and manage storage credentials, which are powerful administrative actions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 5, 2026, 11:05 PM