skills/databricks-solutions/vibe-coding-workshop-template/foundation-model-agent-loop/Gen Agent Trust Hub
foundation-model-agent-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a conversation loop where user input is directly appended to the message history without delimiters or boundary markers. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where a user might attempt to override the system prompt instructions.
- Ingestion points: The
user_messageparameter in therun_agent_loopfunction (SKILL.md) is the primary entry point for untrusted data. - Boundary markers: The implementation does not use any delimiters (such as XML tags or triple quotes) to separate user content from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute any function defined in the
TOOL_FUNCTIONSmap, including database queries (query_genie) and price calculations. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering applied to the
user_messagebefore it is sent to the LLM. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a dispatch map (
TOOL_FUNCTIONS) to execute local code based on model output. While this is restricted to a specific set of functions, it represents the primary mechanism through which an injected prompt could cause the agent to perform unintended actions. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The code uses the
requestslibrary to make HTTP POST requests to Databricks-hosted serving endpoints. These requests are authenticated using the officialdatabricks-sdkand target legitimate Databricks infrastructure.
Audit Metadata