sillytavern-extension-builder

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The scripts/scaffold_extension.sh script executes shell commands (mkdir, cp, sed) using variables derived directly from user input (e.g., EXT_SLUG).
  • Evidence: The script uses mkdir -p "$TARGET_DIR" where TARGET_DIR is constructed from a user-provided root and slug. A malicious slug like ../../../tmp/poc could enable path traversal.
  • Risk: Unauthorized file system writes or overwriting critical system/application files.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) due to its core function of converting untrusted user input into executable assets.
  • Ingestion points: User requirements for extension names, authors, and behavioral logic processed in SKILL.md and passed to scripts/scaffold_extension.sh.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from obeying embedded instructions within user-provided metadata.
  • Capability inventory: Direct filesystem write access via bash scripts and the generation of JavaScript code intended for execution in a web environment.
  • Sanitization: The escape_sed function in the shell script only escapes / and &. It does not sanitize shell metacharacters or JavaScript-specific injection strings.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The provided templates (assets/templates/extension-slash/index.js) incorporate dynamic module loading.
  • Evidence: The importFromUrl function uses await import(url) to load dependencies at runtime.
  • Risk: While the template currently uses hardcoded local paths, the pattern facilitates dynamic loading which could be exploited to load remote malicious scripts if the URL generation is compromised.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 15, 2026, 08:37 PM