geopandas

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill is designed to ingest data from untrusted external sources and has capabilities that could lead to significant side effects if manipulated.
  • Ingestion points: gpd.read_file() (via references/data-io.md) accepts remote URLs, S3 buckets, and Azure Blob Storage; gpd.read_postgis() reads from external databases.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; no instructions are provided to the agent to treat external geospatial metadata or database records as untrusted.
  • Capability inventory: gdf.to_file() allows writing to the filesystem or remote storage; gpd.read_postgis() and gdf.to_postgis() allow execution of SQL and database modifications.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is provided to prevent SQL injection or malicious data from affecting downstream decision-making.
  • External Downloads (LOW): The skill specifies installation of multiple dependencies via uv pip install.
  • Evidence: geopandas, folium, mapclassify, pyarrow, psycopg2, geoalchemy2, contextily, cartopy.
  • Status: These are standard, well-known geospatial libraries from trusted ecosystems. Per [TRUST-SCOPE-RULE], the risk is downgraded to LOW.
  • Command Execution (LOW): Installation instructions use shell commands, which is expected behavior for library-based skills.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 15, 2026, 09:09 PM