literature-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/generate_pdf.pyscript invokes system-level binariespandocandxelatexviasubprocess.run. Although the script uses argument lists to mitigate shell injection, it empowers the agent to execute external software on the host. TheSKILL.mdfile also refers to ascripts/generate_schematic.pyfor diagram generation, which is not present in the provided file list, indicating a dependency on external or missing components.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on external software (pandoc,xelatex) and therequestslibrary. Thescripts/verify_citations.pyscript performs network operations todoi.organdapi.crossref.orgto retrieve and validate citation metadata.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from academic databases (e.g., PubMed, bioRxiv, arXiv), creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.\n - Ingestion points: Research data such as paper titles and abstracts are ingested via JSON files and processed by
scripts/search_databases.py.\n - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or specific guidance for the model to disregard instructions potentially hidden in the scientific content.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has
Bashaccess and the ability to execute system commands and network requests.\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitizing the scientific text for adversarial prompt patterns.
Audit Metadata