obsidian-clipper-template-creator

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill employs the WebFetch tool to ingest untrusted HTML from external URLs (documented in references/analysis-workflow.md). This allows an attacker to host a page with malicious instructions hidden in Schema.org data, meta tags, or content that could override the agent's system prompt or session logic.
  • Ingestion points: The WebFetch function call in references/analysis-workflow.md retrieves arbitrary external data.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to treat fetched HTML as untrusted data or to ignore instructions contained within it.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to read local files (Templates/Bases/) and perform network fetches via WebFetch.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The agent is instructed to parse raw HTML for data extraction without filtering or validation.
  • Data Exposure (MEDIUM): The skill is designed to read local .base files from the user's filesystem (Templates/Bases/*.base) as part of its core workflow (documented in SKILL.md and references/bases-workflow.md). While these files are intended for template creation, the explicit instruction to access the local filesystem creates a pathway for data exposure if an attacker successfully executes a prompt injection.
  • Command Execution (LOW): The skill relies on the WebFetch tool to interact with the network. While this is a standard capability for this type of agent, it represents a tool-use command that can be chained with other vulnerabilities.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 15, 2026, 09:18 PM