pdf

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill is primarily designed to ingest and process data from external, untrusted PDF files using libraries like pypdf and pdfplumber.
  • Ingestion points: Found in SKILL.md (e.g., PdfReader("document.pdf")), scripts/check_fillable_fields.py, and scripts/extract_form_field_info.py.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions in forms.md do not provide delimiters or instructions for the agent to treat extracted PDF content as untrusted data, increasing the risk that embedded malicious instructions could be obeyed.
  • Capability inventory: The skill grants the agent the ability to write files (PdfWriter.write), execute shell commands (qpdf, pdftotext), and perform OCR (pytesseract).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the extracted text or metadata before it is presented to the agent for analysis or decision-making.
  • [Dynamic Execution] (MEDIUM): The script scripts/fill_fillable_fields.py implements monkeypatch_pydpf_method(), which modifies the pypdf library's DictionaryObject.get_inherited method at runtime. While documented as a bug fix, runtime modification of third-party libraries is a risky pattern that can be used to alter security-critical behavior.
  • [Command Execution] (LOW): SKILL.md explicitly instructs the agent to use various command-line utilities (qpdf, pdftk, poppler-utils). While these are standard tools, they expand the attack surface if the agent is tricked into passing malicious arguments via prompt injection.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 15, 2026, 08:45 PM