requesting-code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The code-reviewer.md template interpolates untrusted external data like {DESCRIPTION} and {WHAT_WAS_IMPLEMENTED} directly into the prompt without boundary markers. An attacker could embed instructions in these fields to manipulate the agent's review logic. Evidence Chain: 1. Ingestion points: {WHAT_WAS_IMPLEMENTED}, {PLAN_OR_REQUIREMENTS}, {BASE_SHA}, {HEAD_SHA}, {DESCRIPTION} in code-reviewer.md. 2. Boundary markers: Absent. 3. Capability inventory: git command execution in code-reviewer.md. 4. Sanitization: Absent.
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (LOW): The skill dynamically constructs shell commands (git diff --stat {BASE_SHA}..{HEAD_SHA}) using runtime variables. While limited to Git, this pattern could lead to command injection if the input variables are not properly validated or escaped before execution.
Audit Metadata