skill-installer
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill's core purpose is to download and install executable code (scripts and instructions) into the agent's working directory (
$CODEX_HOME/skills). - Evidence: The script
scripts/install-skill-from-github.pyaccepts arbitrary--repoand--urlarguments. - Impact: Successfully installing a malicious skill gives an attacker persistent influence over the agent's behavior and access to the host environment.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (HIGH): While the skill defaults to a trusted repository (openai/skills), it permits connections to any GitHub repository, including private ones using local credentials.
- Evidence: Support for
--repo <owner>/<repo>and fallback togit sparse checkoutfor arbitrary sources. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The installation process involves executing shell-level operations (git, curl) and requires sandbox escalation to function.
- Evidence: Explicit instructions to 'request escalation when running' scripts due to network and file system requirements.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): This skill represents a significant attack surface for indirect injection. The data ingested from external repositories (skill definitions) determines the agent's future logic and constraints.
- Ingestion points: GitHub API (skill listing) and repository file contents (installation).
- Boundary markers: None mentioned; the agent is expected to 'pick up new skills' immediately after restart.
- Capability inventory: The skill has file-write access to the agent's skill directory and network access.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or verification of the downloaded skill content is described.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata