skill-installer

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill's core purpose is to download and install executable code (scripts and instructions) into the agent's working directory ($CODEX_HOME/skills).
  • Evidence: The script scripts/install-skill-from-github.py accepts arbitrary --repo and --url arguments.
  • Impact: Successfully installing a malicious skill gives an attacker persistent influence over the agent's behavior and access to the host environment.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (HIGH): While the skill defaults to a trusted repository (openai/skills), it permits connections to any GitHub repository, including private ones using local credentials.
  • Evidence: Support for --repo <owner>/<repo> and fallback to git sparse checkout for arbitrary sources.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The installation process involves executing shell-level operations (git, curl) and requires sandbox escalation to function.
  • Evidence: Explicit instructions to 'request escalation when running' scripts due to network and file system requirements.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): This skill represents a significant attack surface for indirect injection. The data ingested from external repositories (skill definitions) determines the agent's future logic and constraints.
  • Ingestion points: GitHub API (skill listing) and repository file contents (installation).
  • Boundary markers: None mentioned; the agent is expected to 'pick up new skills' immediately after restart.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has file-write access to the agent's skill directory and network access.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or verification of the downloaded skill content is described.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 15, 2026, 08:57 PM