gcp-gke-troubleshooting

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 24, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructs the agent to retrieve sensitive information using commands like kubectl get secret [NAME] -n wtr-supplier-charges -o yaml. This action exposes the contents of Kubernetes secrets, including potentially sensitive configuration and credentials, to the agent's processing context.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflows utilize the Bash tool to execute high-impact commands such as kubectl patch, kubectl scale, and gcloud projects add-iam-policy-binding. These commands allow the agent to modify the cluster state and GCP project IAM policies.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructions suggest reading from local files, specifically $(cat key.json), which typically contains sensitive service account keys or credentials, for use in creating Kubernetes registry secrets.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from Kubernetes logs and events.
  • Ingestion points: kubectl logs, kubectl describe, and kubectl get events commands in SKILL.md and examples/examples.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define delimiters or provide warnings to the agent regarding the content of logs.
  • Capability inventory: Extensive capabilities via Bash, including kubectl (read/write/patch) and gcloud (resource and IAM management).
  • Sanitization: Absent. Logs and descriptions are displayed and analyzed without filtering.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 24, 2026, 05:23 PM