uv-dependency-management

[Skill Scanner] Pipe-to-shell or eval pattern detected All findings: [CRITICAL] command_injection: Pipe-to-shell or eval pattern detected (CI013) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: URL pointing to executable file detected (CI010) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] supply_chain: Reference to external script with install/setup context (SC005) The documentation is functionally legitimate and matches expected dependency-management behaviors. The strongest security concern is the explicit instruction to execute a remote installer via `curl ... | sh` from astral.sh without any verification, which is a high-risk supply-chain pattern. There are no hardcoded secrets or obvious in-document exfiltration instructions. Treat the installer step as untrusted until you can verify the script (download and inspect, check signatures/published checksums, or use an alternative verified installation method). Recommend updating the documentation to provide verified installation options and to warn users about the risks of piping remote scripts to shell. LLM verification: The SKILL.md content is benign documentation for a dependency-management tool; the primary security concern is the explicit recommendation to install 'uv' using an unpinned pipe-to-shell (curl | sh) from https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh. That pattern is a high-risk supply-chain vector absent integrity verification. There is no evidence within this document of embedded malware or obfuscated code, but following the installer instruction could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on the fetche