promptfoo-evaluation
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill instructs the agent to run shell commands via
npx promptfoo@latest, which downloads and executes external code on the host machine. It also heavily promotes the execution of local Python scripts using thefile://protocol for custom assertions (e.g.,scripts/metrics.py). - DATA_EXFILTRATION (LOW): Information Exposure. The
SKILL.mdfile contains a hardcoded absolute path (/Users/tiansheng/Workspace/prompts/tiaogaoren/) which exposes the author's local username and internal directory structure to the agent. - EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (LOW): The skill utilizes
npxto fetch thepromptfoopackage from the npm registry at runtime, introducing a dependency on an external repository. - PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): Indirect Prompt Injection Surface. The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data within LLM prompts using template variables like
{{user_input}}. Evidence: - Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Few-Shot Pattern) andchat.json. - Boundary markers: None; variables are interpolated directly into prompts.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution, local file system read/write via configuration, and Python script execution.
- Sanitization: No evidence of input validation or escaping for the template variables.
Audit Metadata