orchestrating-tmux-claudes

[Skill Scanner] Instruction directing agent to run/execute external content All findings: [CRITICAL] command_injection: Instruction directing agent to run/execute external content (CI011) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Instruction directing agent to run/execute external content (CI011) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] The coordinator document is a functional and coherent orchestration plan for managing AI agent CLIs in tmux panes. It does not contain explicit malicious code or obfuscation, but it provides high-impact capabilities (arbitrary command execution in panes, writing unredacted logs to /tmp, automatically committing generated changes) that present a moderate supply-chain risk if agent CLIs are untrusted or if the automation is misused. The primary concerns are automatic commits without human review, local logging of potentially sensitive outputs, and implicit exfiltration risk via external AI CLIs. Mitigations should focus on requiring manual approval for commits, restricting or encrypting logs, and vetting/isolating external CLIs. LLM verification: The skill matches its stated purpose and does not contain obvious obfuscated payloads or hard-coded network exfiltration endpoints. However, it prescribes powerful operations that can execute arbitrary commands in other panes and persist their output to world-accessible /tmp files. These behaviors create moderate supply-chain and operational risk: potential local credential exposure, enabling of network exfiltration via injected commands, and retention of sensitive outputs in unprotected logs. R