NYC

solid-queue-setup

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 13, 2026

Risk Level: LOWNO_CODE
Full Analysis

The SKILL.md file is a markdown document providing instructions and code snippets for configuring Solid Queue. The allowed tools (Read, Write, Edit, Bash, Glob, Grep) indicate the agent's capabilities, but the content itself does not exploit these in a malicious way.

  1. Prompt Injection: No patterns indicative of prompt injection (e.g., 'IMPORTANT: Ignore', role-play injection) were found in the skill's name, description, or content.

  2. Data Exfiltration: The bash commands (bundle add solid_queue, bin/rails solid_queue:install, bin/rails db:migrate, bin/rails solid_queue:start) and ruby/yaml code snippets are standard for Rails application setup and do not involve accessing sensitive files (like ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_rsa) or sending data to untrusted external domains.

  3. Obfuscation: No obfuscation techniques such as Base64 encoding, zero-width characters, Unicode homoglyphs, or URL/hex/HTML encoding were detected in the skill's content.

  4. Unverifiable Dependencies: The skill instructs the user to install solid_queue and mission_control-jobs gems via bundle add. While these are external dependencies, they are core components of the Rails ecosystem, maintained by the Rails core team or closely associated projects. In the context of a Rails application, these are considered trusted sources. Therefore, this is noted as an informational finding but does not elevate the overall risk.

  5. Privilege Escalation: No commands like sudo, doas, chmod +x, chmod 777, or attempts to modify system-wide configuration files (/etc/) were found. The bin/rails solid_queue:install command generates application-specific files, not system-level ones.

  6. Persistence Mechanisms: There are no attempts to establish persistence by modifying shell configuration files (.bashrc, .zshrc), creating cron jobs, or configuring systemd/LaunchAgent services. The recurring.yml configures internal Solid Queue jobs, not system-level persistence.

  7. Metadata Poisoning: The name and description fields are benign and accurately reflect the skill's purpose. No malicious instructions were found in the metadata.

  8. Indirect Prompt Injection: The skill is purely instructional and does not process external user-supplied content, so it does not introduce a risk of indirect prompt injection into the LLM.

  9. Time-Delayed / Conditional Attacks: No conditional logic based on dates, times, usage counts, or environment variables was found that could trigger malicious behavior.

Conclusion: The skill is a well-structured guide for a standard Rails component. The external dependencies are from trusted sources within the Rails ecosystem. No security vulnerabilities or malicious patterns were identified.

Audit Metadata
Risk Level
LOW
Analyzed
Feb 13, 2026, 08:00 AM