team-implement
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it incorporates dynamic data into sub-agent instructions.
- Ingestion points: The variables
{feature},{module}, and{task list}are interpolated into the system prompts for 'Implementer' and 'Tester' agents inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not utilize delimiters (such as XML tags or markdown blocks) to isolate untrusted task descriptions from the core agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: Sub-agents are granted file-write access and the ability to execute terminal commands (e.g.,
ruff). - Sanitization: No logic is present to sanitize or escape the content of the task lists before they are added to the prompt templates.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local command-line tools for quality assurance and integration.
- Evidence: Step 4 in
SKILL.mdinvokesuv run ruff,uv run pytest,uv run ty, andpoe all. - Description: These are standard developer tools for linting, testing, and task automation. Their use is consistent with the skill's purpose of managing a codebase implementation.
Audit Metadata